In 1992, a superficially similar contrast presented itself in the opposing presidential candidates. On one side, as embodied in its champion, George Bush, the Republican Party appealed to the religious right by advocating "prayer in public schools, severe restrictions on abortion, [and] discrimination against homosexuals .... "5 On the other side, Bill Clinton and the Democrats offered a message of simple toleration without any overt religious endorsement. Clinton prevailed, perhaps because of the unanticipated reaction to what many Americans perceived as the politics of hatred and division espoused by the Republicans at their 1992 convention. 6 The 1992 election may be symptomatic of the antireligious sentiment that currently pervades American discourse. Many consider faith and worship as "hobbies," and treat religious views with thinly veiled contempt in the "public square."7 America's current aversion to including the religious voice in the cacophony of public debate may be compared with the emotionalism of the midcentury's anti-intellectual movement. But the anti-intellectualism of the 1950s had firm roots in America's past, while the modern disregard for religion is a relatively recent development. Indeed, religion has played an essential part in American society since Colonial times. Religion helped to shape the early law of the country, functioning as "a unifying force in the colonial experience."8 Its impact is not simply a memory of the distant past: religion thrived in American life as recently as the 1950s. 9 Even today, Americans remain a religious people. lO Yet religion as an institution finds itself besieged, not for sponsoring unpopular views, such as those elaborated at the 1992 Republican fought" STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAw AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 51 (1993) . As a forum for debate and discourse, the "public square" represents an aspect of the abstract "marketplace of ideas," and its very existence likewise "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public .... " Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,20 (1945) . 5 CARTER, supra note 4, at 49. 6 Or, perhaps, Clinton won because Americans genuinely desired change from the Republican excesses of the previous 12 years. Answering this question is, naturally, beyond the scope of this Review. 7 See CARTER, supra note 4, at 25-26,51-56. 8KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAw IN AMERICAN HISTORY 14 (1989). Though churches were "significantly less important as legal institutions than in England," the "law of God and the Bible" nonetheless functioned as sources of Colonial law. Id. at 26. Early Americans "looked to their churches as institutions of conflict resolution and social control." Id. 9 See CHAFE, supra note 3, at 120-21. Ironically, this was the period when anti-intellectualism was at its peak. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
10 1993 surveys show that a majority of Americans believe in God, and a large number regularly attend worship services. See CARTER, supra note 4, at 4, 279 n.2.
Convention, but simply because these views are religious. ll The current assaults target religion itself rather than the agendas with which the name of religion has come to be associated. In The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion, Stephen L. Carter l2 suggests that "[t]he trouble with the attacks on the 1992 Republican Convention is that most of them were misdirected"; the causes, not the religion, "should have been the object of criticism. "13
This position is a difficult one. The resurgence of the Christian movement in the right wing of the Republican Party resembled an effort to turn back the clock of American social and political progress. But Carter's point is well taken. In our collective desire to prevent religion from commingling with the state and dominating our politics, ''we have created a political and legal culture that presses the religiously faithful to be other than themselves, to act publicly, and sometimes privately as well, as though their faith does not matter to them."14 Carter speaks of more than simply encouraging tolerance of differing religious views. He disdains a society that emphasizes the "right to believe," but encourages the faithful to keep their beliefs to themselves. 15 Moreover, Carter argues that the religious be allowed entry to the "public square," because religions function as natural and essential "bulwarks against state authority. "16
In exploring these ideas throughout The Culture of Disbelief, Carter considers "the case for taking religion seriously as an aspect of the lives and personas of the tens of millions of Americans who insist that religion is for them of first importance."17 In the book's first section, II Like Carter, this Review uses the term "religion" to refer to "a tradition of group worship (as against individual metaphysic) that presupposes the existence of a sentience beyond the human and capable of acting outside of the observed principles and limits of natural science, and, further, a tradition that makes demands of some kind on its adherents." Id. at 17. 12 Stephen L. 
II. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
"To be consistent with the Founders' vision and coherent in modern religiously pluralistic America," Carter writes, "the religion clauses should be read to help avoid tyranny-that is, to sustain and nurture the religions as independent centers of power [and as] democratic intermediaries .... "28 To this end, courts must do more than simply protect religion against overt discrimination. 29 This ideal has become increasingly speculative. The Supreme Court has consistently looked "askance at claims of a free exercise right to violate laws that everyone else must obey."30 In its most notorious decision on the subject, Employment Division v. Smith,31 the Court held that an antidrug law that incidentally banned the use of peyote during Native American Church rituals did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 32 In this ruling, the Court chose not to apply strict scrutiny to what it considered a neutral, generally applicable law. 33 The import of the Court's decision in Smith was twofold. First, it had the effect of reinforcing the continued dominance of accepted, "majority" religions in America. 34 Indeed, "not a single religious exemption claim has ever reached the Supreme Court from a mainstream Christian religious practitioner" because mainstream Christianity "does not need judicial help .... "35 Legislatures do not enact laws offensive to mainstream religious organizations because most legislators are members of mainstream religions; therefore, laws that have the "incidental effect" of burdening religion virtually never impact on the lawmakers themselves. 43 a neutral law of general applicability "need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice."44 But if a law is not both neutral and generally applicable, it will survive only if the government articulates a compelling interest, and if the law is "narrowly tailored to advance that interest. "45 The Court held that, in this instance, the city ordinances failed to satisfY these requirements. The ordinances were not neutral because the city enacted them to suppress a central element of the Santeria worship service. The cumulative effect of the text, history, and operation of the ordinances amounted to outright "animosity to Santeria adherents and their religious practices . . . . "46 The ordinances also were not generally applicable, since the city decided to pursue governmental interests only with respect to "conduct with a religious motivation. "47 Because of this, the Court concluded that the ordinances had "every appearance of a prohibition that society [was] prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers] but not upon itself."48
Only after determining that the ordinances were neither neutral nor of general applicability did the Court impose rigorous scrutiny upon them, stating that in order to satisfY "the commands of the First Amendment," laws restricting religious practice "must advance 'interests of the highest order'" and must "be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests."49 Even assuming, arguendo, that the city presented compelling interests, it did not draw the ordinances narrowly, for each ordinance was "overbroad or underinclusive in substantial respects."50 The absence of narrow tailoring alone sufficed to establish the ordi- [Vol. 14:163 nances' unconstitutionality.51 Moreover, the ordinances lacked any compelling governmental interest because they restricted only religious activity while allowing other substantially similar conduct to continue unfettered. 52 On the surface, the Court's opinion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah appears to be a resounding reaffirmation of the constitutional principles supporting a group's right to practice its religion, however unusual such practice appears to Western sensibilities. As the Court stated, "[lJegislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices. "53 Beyond such lofty rhetoric, however, Church of the Lukumi clearly represents the exception rather than the norm in free exercise cases; the Supreme Court has "overwhelmingly rejected free exercise exemption claims," usually by finding "some reason to forego any searching judicial scrutiny .... "54
Church of the Lukumi is the proverbial easy case. Courts do not often confront legislation so blatantly designed to single out particular religious conduct for prohibition. As Justice Souter observed in his concurrence, "the Hialeah City Council has provided a rare example of a law actually aimed at suppressing religious exercise .... "55 More typically, courts will face a law like that in Smith: formally neutral and generally applicable. Justice Souter, recognizing that the Smith rule does violence to the meaning and, indeed, the very existence of the Free Exercise Clause, would impart the test with some substantive meaning. He would define "neutrality" as barring more than facially neutral laws-those ''with an object to discriminate against religion"-by also requiring government "to accommodate religious differences by exempting religious practices from formally neutral laws. "56 Souter's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause would, if adopted, necessitate more probing judicial scrutiny in these cases. It would allow a reviewing court to determine whether a particular law is de facto discriminatory against a "minority" religion by ascertaining whether the law operates to "impose [] greater costs on religious than on comparable nonreligious activities,"57 thereby precluding a religious practice and, by extension, undermining "adherence to religious belief."58 In addition to protecting nonmainstream religions, such scrutiny would inevitably slow the Free Exercise Clause's "reduction" into a hollow incantation, by reaffirming its constitutional place in securing an individual's right to practice a particular religious faith. 59 Moreover, giving "neutrality" substantive meaning would engender respect for religion as religion, rather than treating it "like any other belief. "60 Naturally, these objectives could also be accomplished by requiring strict scrutiny of free exercise claims from the start, rather than requiring a court to first determine that a particular law is not neutral and generally applicable. 61 As Carter admits, this "is not to say that the religions should always win and thus be exempt from the laws that apply to everybody else. "62 But the government would have the burden of proof to justifY the suppression of religious conduct. A compelling interest test would thus help to achieve a functional vision of religion "as [ to show a compelling interest before it would be able to apply a neutral law in a way that interfered with a central aspect of a religious practice .... "65 But the Act does not necessarily alter the country's vision of the role of religion, for "righ ts become mired in the delicate negotiations over statutory drafting," eventually "looking as cramped and instrumental as anything else that government does."66 Nor does the act undo free exercise jurisprudence so far as the Constitution is concerned. Supreme Court decisions like Smith and Lyng still tell us that the Constitution has little to do with preventing government from restraining uncommon religions, though it forbids government from pursuing similar interests with regard to comparable secular moral and political institutions.
III. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Carter freely acknowledges that not all religious contributions to the "public square" are constitutionally permissible under the Establishment Clause. He rightly criticizes the Supreme Court's lack of a coherent Establishment Clause theory, exemplified by the haphazard application of the oft-cited Lemon test. Lemon v. Kurtzman 67 provided that statutes must have a secular purpose, the primary effect of which neither enhances nor inhibits religion, nor fosters "an excessive government entanglement with religion."68 Over the years, a number of Supreme Court justices have condemned the test 69 without offering an alternative that encompasses what Carter views as the Establishment Clauses's central purpose: to protect religion from the state, and not the state from religion. 70
Liberal political theory posits a world where government remains unequivocally neutral in the debate between competing moral and theological visions of society.71 Carter's view of the Establishment Clause defies traditional liberal thought by breaching the metaphorical wall separating church and state.72 Carter's analysis has a historical basis; as he notes, unlike many constitutional provisions:
we actually know a great deal about the history of the Establishment Clause and about the development of the ideal of a separated church and state. We know so much, in fact, that it is something of an embarrassment that we so enthusiastically ignore our knowledge in our church-and-state jurisprudence. 73
The Framers understood that the role of religion was apolitical, and that to fulfill this role, government should not have the opportunity to regulate religion. 74 Thus, the Clause should work not to "disable religious groups from active involvement" in the "public square," but to protect religious liberty from control by the state. 75 For example, where the Clause is used as a sword in the fight against granting religious nonprofit organizations tax-exempt status, it has the incidental effect of empowering the state as the primary actor in the "public square." Carter equates such treatment with "tyranny," though "it is called the separation of held that "government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit. "87 Applying this standard to the facts, the Court reasoned that because the service at issue was "part of a general government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'handicapped,"'88 without regard to the religious nature of the school, it was simply a neutral service offered as a part of a general program "in no way skewed towards religion .... "89 Nor did the physical presence of a public employee in the classroom create a constitutional problem, because the government's provision of an interpreter did not relieve the school "of an expense that it otherwise would have assumed in educating its students. "90
The Court's decision in ZolJrestoffends traditional liberal thinking:
it is doubtful whether the state could be any less neutral toward religion than by placing a public employee at the disposal of sectarian masters. Such a placement promotes religion, in violation of the second prong of the Lemon test,91 by making the public employee "the conduit for ... religious education .... ''92 Moreover, ZolJrest is antithetical to the idea that the Establishment Clause should "protect[] individuals from compulsory financial support of other people's religion ... .' '93 The purpose of a liberal reading of the Clause is to encourage a "public square" with a theoretically even playing field, upon which no particular faith has an advantage over any other. The price of such an approach is an "asymmetrical treatment" of religion as compared to other moral and political institutions, denying religion the state's financial support while allowing it for similar secular institutions. 94 The traditional liberal approach to ZolJrest would prevent the provision of a public employee to the sectarian school, in effect preventing religion from claiming its share of government largess. But the actual decision does not necessarily embrace Carter's vision of the Establishment Clause; if anything, it works to negate religion's role as an intermediary force in American life. As Justice Blackmun noted, the 87 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466.
case involved nothing less than enlisting "the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy."95 The situation entailed "ongoing, daily, and intimate governmental participation in the teaching and propagation of religious doctrine."96 Thus, Zobrest does not represent a genuine recognition of religion's independent character, for it envisions a sharing of responsibilities between government and religion that can only work to undermine religious autonomy. As the Court stated in Engel v. Vitale, the "union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion. "97 Articulating a coherent Establishment Clause constitutionalism is no small task. Though Carter would advise that religions be treated like any secular group, he admits that such treatment opens the door to potential state regulation. 98 It is doubtful whether any court would ever allow the state to become involved in the actual administration of a particular religion, but it is well established that where government provides funding, it may also impose conditions. 99 In the end, then, a traditional liberal reading of the Establishment Clause, as informed by Carter's analysis, may offer the soundest approach to cases like Zobrest.
To review: in order to insure a common baseline in the "public square," so that no single religious voice may drown out another, the state must act neutrally, neither promoting nor inhibiting religion; this discourages the state from capitalizing upon its regulatory power to religion's detriment. In essence, the state discriminates against all religions, because they may not partake of the benefits available to their secular counterparts. But religions, released from the threat of state incursion, are consequently freer to function as the Framers envisioned: to discover and argue "meanings that are in competition with those imposed by the state. "lOO Of course, this balancing is not perfect, but neither is the world in which we live. Demanding a perfect modern constitutionalism where so many interests conflict seems, if not unreasonable, at least somewhat disingenuous.
